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Development, Change, and Poverty in the
Informal Sector during the Era of Structural
Adjustments in Tanzania
Joe L.P. Lugalla

Résumé
Le secteur informel urbain en Afrique est toujours trés dynamique et a
constamment évolué en harmonie avec la nature des processus sociaux,
économiques et politiques. Cette analyse du développement du secteur
informel pendant la période d’adaptation en Tanzanie affirme que le
secteur informel a considérablement changé: son importance, sa nature
et le genre d’activités entreprises, ses participants, les relations sociales
et les formes de propriété. Le secteur informel n’est plus seulement
l’apanage des pauvres sans ressources, mais aussi celui de groupes
sociaux à moyens revenus et de riches capitalistes. Diverses classes
utilisent le secteur informel à des fins différentes. Tandis que les pauvres
s’en servent pour survivre, les revenus moyens et bas le font pour supplémenter leur revenu officiel. Les riches capitalistes s’en servent eux pour
s’enrichir d’avantages. La situation a exacerbé la concurrence dont les
effets négatifs se sont fait sentir sur la majorité pauvre. Les décideurs de
politiques se doivent de comprendre cette dynamique parce que, si l’on
accorde aveuglément de l’aide à ce secteur, cette aide pourrait bien
n’∏tre d’aucune utilité aux pauvres sans ressources qui en ont grand
besoin et sont tr∑s peu assistés.

Introduction
During periods of economic crisis and structural adjustments in
Tanzania, the informal sector has changed both quantitatively and
The original longer version of this paper was presented in Vienna at a conference
on Neo-Liberalism and Development, organized by the University of Vienna, 2729 November 1996. I wish to acknowledge the assistance of the Economic and
Social Research Foundation of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and the Center for the
Humanities at the University of New Hampshire for funding the study on the
informal sector, whose findings have been used in writing this article, as well as
the anonymous reviewers of the Canadian Journal of African Studies for their very
constructive comments.
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qualitatively. The traditional view that the informal sector
accommodates the unemployed, the poor, the unskilled, as well as
utilizing family labour and local resources, is questionable in
most of the sub-Saharan countries which are experiencing a severe
economic crisis and have adopted structural adjustment policies
(SAPs). Policy programs aimed at promoting the informal sector
must acknowledge the fact that the crisis, as well as SAPs, have
forced not only the poor, but also middle and upper income
persons and rich entrepreneurs, to participate in this sector.
Policies must reexamine the dominant forms of social relations in
this sector in order to determine who actually needs assistance
and how best to help them. Promoting this sector blindly might
enhance the processes of social and economic inequality, exploitation, oppression, and marginalization which are currently
rampant in the informal sector.

Historical Context
A decade of economic reforms in Tanzania has been associated
with various social and economic impacts on different social
groups in Tanzania. An indication of how adjustments have
affected the conditions of life for the majority of the population is
the rapid mushrooming of informal sector activities. This sector
has expanded very fast and in many new dimensions during the
last few years as a result of the economic crisis of the late 1970s
and 1980s. This growth is part of a series of survival strategies
people have adopted to weather the crisis (Tripp 1990, 49). It is
now evident that the majority of the urban poor, as well as both
the middle and high income urban working classes, derive or
supplement their incomes from this sector. A decade ago, the
wages of an average worker were capable of supporting the family
of the worker and other relatives, but today most people cannot
survive by depending solely on their wages and are thus forced to
look for other survival strategies. As A.M. Tripp (1990, 51) has
argued, survival requires that household heads have additional
income-generating activities and that other household members,
especially women and children, also practice income-generating
activities. These may include agriculture, animal husbandry,
sewing, food vending, shoemaking, carpentry, and hairdressing —
in short, anything that produces income. The advantage of the
informal sector is that it produces a wide range of basic goods and

426

cjas / rcea 31:3 1997

services, most of which are consumed by a majority of the
growing urban population. Therefore, if well conceived and
promoted, this sector may provide an important tool for creating
employment opportunities and reducing the rate of inequality and
poverty.
What is happening in Tanzania is also happening in many
other countries in sub-Saharan Africa which have adopted the
Bretton Woods institutions’ (the World Bank and IMF) prescription for economic crisis. Most of these countries, either independently or with the assistance of these institutions, as well as of
NGOs and donor countries, have designed or are designing policies, whose objective is the promotion of the informal sector.
These countries strongly believe that the informal sector can
contribute to generating employment, promoting economic
growth, and alleviating poverty. For example, in April 1995, the
Ministry of Labour and Youth Development of Tanzania produced
a government policy paper on micro-enterprises and informal
sector promotion. Although this policy is still in the proposal
stage, it is likely that, if approved, it will become the official
policy to promote the informal sector. The document spells out
ways and strategies which the government intends to promote the
informal sector.
In order to design an appropriate policy to promote the
informal sector, it is first important to understand the general
processes of social change in Tanzania, particularly those which
are associated with economic reforms. Second, it is crucial to
examine the extent to which these changes have affected the
informal sector. This reasoning is based on the assumptions that,
like any other sector, the informal sector has undergone tremendous changes during the period of economic reforms (SAPs) and
that one needs to fully understand these changes in order to
suggest appropriate policy measures to further promote it. In order
to understand these changes, an historical analysis of the development of the informal sector in Tanzania is important.

Colonialism and the Development of the Informal
Sector
The informal sector is not a recent phenomena in Tanzania, but
instead started to surface during the period of colonialism. The
only major difference between the informal sector under colo-
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nialism and now is that it has grown quite considerably and has
come to dominate the sphere of social and economic activities
where the majority of the urban surplus labour force operates.
During colonialism, the sector was not that significant, and the
scale of informal sector activities was small. Although methods of
colonization varied between the Germans and the British, setting
the colonial economy in motion necessarily involved a “redirecting” of the means of production within the colony’s interests
and demands. Most affected was the pre-colonial social structure,
including land and labour. It was this “redirecting” of the indigenous labour power that had important consequences on the social
structure — for example, since then, the basic economic structure
is still neo-colonial (Brain 1979, 12).
Colonialism imposed taxation to be paid in money, and the
first Taxation Ordinance was enacted in 1897. The reason behind
taxation was simple: it aimed at increasing the cost of living for
Africans in order to force them to join waged employment.
According to Sir Percy Girouard, Governor of the Protectorate of
Kenya, who stated the following in the East African Standard in
1913:
We consider that the only natural and automatic method of
securing a constant labour supply is to ensure that there shall
be competition among labourers for hire and among
employers for labourers; such competition can be brought
about only by a rise in the cost of living for the native, and this
rise can be produced only by an increase in the tax (Bernstein
1992, 67).
In order to get money for taxes, Africans had to migrate to either
urban or rural areas to seek employment. Others had to be
engaged in peasant cash-crop production. There is not much to be
said about industrialization under colonialism because it was
almost non-existent and colonialists viewed it negatively. For
instance, in 1935, the Secretary of State asserted:
It is undesirable to accelerate industrialization of East Africa
which must for many years to come remain a country of
primary produce.1
The British believed that industrialization would bring ruin to
the tribal society that Cameroon and his administrators were
trying to retain, maintaining that the African worker who was
“detribalized” in the towns was dangerous. His place, instead, was
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either in the village or working for short periods on European
plantations (Coulson 1982). The process of rural-urban migration
was very insignificant during colonialism because the colonial
state established strict laws restricting African urban migration.
One such law, the Colonial Labour Utilization Ordinance of 1923,
regulated the movement of native Africans from the villages to
urban areas and also made it possible for the government both to
account for all blacks living in urban areas and to repatriate any of
them not working to the rural areas. The place for the Africans
was the countryside; very few of them were allowed to live in
urban areas so that they could supply cheap labour to the
European-owned businesses and the colonial government. Thus,
the towns were built in such a way that they reflected the
Europeans’ economic and class interests. Residential segregation
in terms of race and class was therefore set in motion — while
Europeans lived in luxurious and very spacious areas like Oyster
Bay in Dar es Salaam, the Africans were pushed away to shanty
towns which were ill-planned and lacked essential basic services
and facilities. Ilala and Magomeni Quarters in Dar es Salaam, for
example, developed as a result of these policies.
Regardless of these restrictions, as the years passed, the
number of Africans in urban areas increased mainly as a result of
the following three factors. First, some Africans established
permanent residence in urban areas and never went back to their
rural places of origin. Second, the children born in urban areas
grew up there and usually decided to remain there. Third, some of
the Africans who worked as household helpers or clerks in the
colonial bureaucracy remained in urban areas when their
contracts ended or when their European masters went to other
places or returned home. As a result, the urban population grew,
as did the urban unemployment problem. When the colonial state
realized that the number of unemployed Africans was increasing
in urban areas, it passed laws which gave the local authorities the
powers to restrict Africans to particular areas of the towns. Once
land was allocated to them, Africans were supposed to live in
those areas, and these areas could only be used for residential
purposes. Africans were not allowed to erect business structures
such as workshops or shops there. In a way, these regulations militated against the development of entrepreneurship among the
Africans.
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Usually, similar to what it did in residential areas, the colonial
state, operating under the umbrella of local governments, allocated specific business or trading areas for Africans. Public
markets for Africans were opened in almost every urban area. The
famous Kariakoo Market in Dar es Salaam is one such market.
Africans were allowed to operate in these markets provided they
observed the township laws — keeping the areas clean and paying
the necessary market fees. Most of the goods sold in these places
were supposed to be native. Africans were not allowed to trade or
do business, however, in areas which were earmarked as European
trading zones, such as the one in Samora Avenue (formerly called
Independence Avenue) in Dar es Salaam.
Apart from restricting where Africans could trade and what
they could trade, the colonial bureaucracy, because of its racist
ideology and imposition of fees, also made it very difficult for
Africans to obtain trading licenses or permits which were required
by law. In order to circumvent these procedures, syndicates, in
which a person who had a license would allow others to trade
under the same license, were sometimes created. In this way,
some businesses and small-scale enterprises functioned during the
colonial period.2 Other discriminatory colonial policies included
making sure that Africans were a reserve of cheap labour for white
businessmen and the colonial government by creating “first
class” markets for Europeans and “second class” ones for
Africans. In addition, the colonial state established laws and regulations which limited Africans’ easy access to loans and other
credit sources. Such policies adversely affected the development
of entrepreneurial skills among Africans and militated against the
development of small-scale enterprises and the informal sector
(Fapohunda 1990, 82).
However, since colonial towns were not industrial, but
predominantly administrative centers, of the colonial state, they
were not capable of absorbing the surplus labour force which
started growing there. Hence, in order to earn a living, Africans
who were unemployed began engaging in petty income-generating
activities. It was these initiatives that led to the initial development of informal sector activities. Most of the informal sector
activities characterizing this period were in retail trade and
commerce. The well established businessmen, most of whom
were of Asian origin, contracted some Africans who were
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supposed to sell their commodities (mainly clothing) in the rural
areas in exchange for a minimal commission. In the beginning,
the majority of those contracted by Asians were Arabs.
These people hawked commodities from house to house and
from city to village. Since the business was mainly in clothing,
these people were commonly known as Guo-Guo during the early
to mid-1960s. This name comes from a Swahili word nguo,
meaning clothing. Another type of informal business which developed during the colonial period and survived even after independence was the exchange of tradeable goods with other goods
(barter). This type of business, which was popularly known as
Mali kwa Mali, involved the exchange of new commodities like
households utensils for used clothing. While the Guo-Guo system
survived until the mid-1960s, the Mali kwa Mali way of selling
things survived until the mid-1970s. Thus, colonial policies
created conditions which facilitated the development of the
informal sector.

Post-Colonial Policies and the Development of the
Informal Sector
When Tanzania became independent in 1961, it abolished most of
the colonial laws which had encouraged racial segregation and
restricted rural-urban migration. This led to an unprecedented
drift of Africans from rural to urban areas and a resulting rapid
growth in the urban African population. For example, from 1948
to 1957, the rate of growth of the population of Dar es Salaam
increased by nine percent every year, but shot up to fourteen
percent from 1961 to 1967. High rates of growth for the Africans
and predominantly low income populations were also notable in
other smaller towns (Lugalla 1995, 27). It is now believed that
twenty percent of the total Tanzanian population lives in urban
areas. Urban population continues to grow, and about seventy
percent of this increase is a result of rural-urban migration. Recent
information (1995) collected from the Dar es Salaam City Council
shows that the population of Dar es Salaam is now more than
three million, and since independence, Dar es Salaam has been
accommodating a third of the total urban population.
Rapid urbanization amidst economic stagnation has had
serious effects in urban areas. Migrants experience severe difficulties finding not only accommodation, but also employment. They
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are forced to live in informal housing and in squatter settlements
characterized by makeshift houses, where basic social service
facilities are inadequate or do not exist at all. Seventy percent of
the urban population in Tanzania lives in these settlements. In
addition, scarcity of employment opportunities in the urban areas
means that these migrants have to find employment for themselves, trying their hand at any business. The facts that the
number of unemployed urban people increased after independence
and that cities now became more cosmopolitan than before meant
that demands for a variety of services exceeded the ability of the
government to satisfy them.
People, thus, had to develop a variety of informal ways of
meeting these demands. For example, the construction of
informal, squatter housing emerged as a self-employed solution to
the problem of urban housing. This increased amount of construction required people with carpentry, plumbing, and masonry
skills. Since the possibility of formally acquiring these skills was
not easily available to the majority of the poor, informal workshops which taught skills like carpentry emerged, in order to
service the construction industry and to train people through
apprenticeship. A growing population also brought about an
increasing demand for transport systems, which, in turn, attracted
the motor vehicle industry to establish both formal and informal
vehicle repair workshops (garages). In addition, since not all
people could afford new clothing, tailoring started mushrooming.
It is during this period that the informal sector became an
important one in urban Tanzania, with most of the urban poor
using it as a solution to poverty. Most informal sector participants
were unemployed, possessing no skills or knowledge of business
administration. In fact, most of them were untrained workers.
The activities they engaged in ranged from selling vegetables and
charcoal to petty trading or hawking, to carpentry and tailoring,
both of which used locally available raw materials. These
processes changed radically in 1967, however, because of a major
shift in the politics and ideology of development in Tanzania.
In 1967, the ruling party of Tanzania, the Tanganyika African
National Union (TANU), announced through the Arusha
Declaration the decision to build a socialist society based on the
principles of Ujamaa (traditional African way of life). The
Ujamaa policy, whose focus was on rural development and self-
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reliance, not only liberalized movements, but also introduced free
education and medical care. The government nationalized
schools, health institutions, and the so-called “commanding
heights of the economy,” such as land, banks, insurance companies, and other large industries. In order to control the entire
economy, the government created a variety of public companies
(parastatals) to deal with some of the productive activities of the
economy. A lot of privately owned institutions were nationalized.
In order to accommodate village-owned shops and shops owned by
public companies, the government, through the policy of
“Operation Maduka,” closed a lot of privately owned shops in the
rural areas, as well as in some urban areas. The Villages and
Ujamaa Villages Act of 1975 also played a vital role in discouraging individually owned small-scale enterprises in the villages
since it decreed that all industrial units were to be owned by the
village, which was supposed to function as a multi-purpose cooperative society (Havnevik 1986, 280; Tripp 1990, 55). The dominant politics of the day considered private entrepreneurship to be
evil and, therefore, unwanted.
The same thing also happened in urban areas in that the
government set conditions which discouraged private entrepreneurship. Services, the distribution of goods, and a variety of
economic activities were supposed to carried out by state owned
institutions like the Regional Trading Companies. In fact, the
Board of Internal Trade was created in order to facilitate the
participation of the state in commerce. These politics of development slowed the pace of the development of the informal sector
from 1967 to 1980.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, however, the informal sector
started growing rapidly again in Tanzania, becoming a strong force
to reckon with. Why is this so? Findings from my recent study in
this area indicate that the economic crisis and the economic
reform policies (SAPs) which followed this crisis are the main
reasons behind this development. What has been the nature of
this economic crisis and SAPs in Tanzania? And how have they
influenced the development of informal sector?

Crisis, SAPs, and the Development of the Informal
Sector (1981-96)
Tanzania’s social and economic crisis, which began in the mid-
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1970s, manifested itself in extensive and persistent internal and
external macroeconomic imbalances. The internal disequilibrium
was evident mainly in growing savings-investment gaps at a time
when government expenditure was growing. Agricultural production declined, leading to a shortage of foreign earnings. This
shortage of foreign earnings made it difficult for the government
to import manufactured goods from abroad, such as fuel and
industrial spare parts, thus, in turn, paralyzing the industrial
sector and resulting in a progressive decline in industrial capacity
utilization. Acute shortages of basic essential commodities like
clothing, sugar, soap, and cooking oil resulted. Existing data also
demonstrate that real agriculture output declined. The only sector
that continued to expand in real terms was that of public administration and other services (Lipumba 1984, 24).
The fundamental political economy problem of Tanzania at
this time was that material production was decreasing, but public
administration was expanding. In Marxist terms, one would say
that the superstructure had become a fetter to the development of
productive forces. Such growth increased the burden of the
government at a time when the government was experiencing
financial resource constraints. As a consequence, the government
failed to finance and maintain the service infrastructure, as well
as developing a bloated bureaucracy. The quality of services such
as health and education also deteriorated tremendously. Scarcity
of essential commodities became the norm, a fact which encouraged hoarding, black-marketeering, and corruption. Attempts by
the government to introduce a rationing system for the scarce
essential items also ended up creating new contradictions. Long
waiting lines resulted, first in offices to obtain permits and then
at distribution points of these commodities (Lipumba 1984, 24).
Scarcity, permits, hoarding, and higher prices amidst stagnant
wages led to a situation where getting things done now depended
on “who knows whom,” peddling, and corruption. The
burgeoning inflation, which was by then between thirty and forty
percent, and the higher cost of living eroded the purchasing power
of the people. ILO (1982) argued that the real wage in 1980 was
lower than what it had been in 1963 (ILO 1982, 273). Tanzania
experienced a sixty-five percent drop in the value of real wages
from 1979 to 1984, consumer prices increased tenfold from 1976
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to 1986, and, in the same period, the ratio of minimum wage earnings to agricultural value added per worker declined by sixty
percent (Tripp 1990, 49). The breakdown of the transport infrastructure, which resulted from poor roads and a lack of spare parts,
meant that scarcity and exorbitant prices became more apparent
and worse the farther away one lived from the town.
This situation, together with the fact that reintroduced official cooperatives started buying peasants’ crops on credit,
increased the hardships in rural life. Rural producers were forced
to either abandon cash-crop production and concentrate on
producing their own food or continue producing cash crops but
sell them to parallel markets rather than to officially recognized
institutions. By the mid-1980s, it had become evident that the
pattern of life in Tanzania had completely changed. Life had
become more difficult because of the rising cost of living. The
escalating cost of living amidst stagnant incomes meant that the
majority of the people in both rural and urban Tanzania started
looking for extra sources of income. The deteriorating conditions
of life and increased poverty in rural areas pushed people away
from rural life to urban life, thus increasing the size of the unemployed urban population. In order to survive, therefore, one had to
join the urban informal sector. In the mid-1980s, an influx of rural
youth, commonly known as machingas, who survived by
hawking, occurred in urban areas. How did the government react
to this crisis? What kind of policy measures did it adopt in order
to deal with it?
In order to deal with the social and economic crisis, in 1981
the government adopted a variety of its own adjustment policy
measures such as “The National Economic Survival Plan” (NESP)
of 1981 and “The Structural Adjustment Programme” (SAP) of
1982. Finally, it signed an agreement with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1986 and adopted the “Economic
Recovery Programme One/Two” (ERP I/ERP II) or ESAP (Economic
and Social Action Plan) of 1986. This agreement was renewed in
1989. These policy measures sought to attain macroeconomic
balance by bringing national expenditure into line with national
income, to reach greater efficiency in resource allocation by
carrying out resource switching across economic sectors, to
reduce inflation and foreign exchange constraints by increasing
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exports and encouraging the use of locally available raw materials,
and, finally, to mobilize resources over the longer term in order to
raise rates of economic growth and living standards, in particular
of the majority poor. What has been the impact of these policies
on the development of the informal sector? To understand the
impact of SAPs on the informal sector requires an understanding
of the impact of SAPs on the general living conditions of the
majority of the people.

SAPs, Living Conditions, and the Development of the
Informal Sector
On the one hand, the crisis affected the general conditions of life
for the majority of Tanzanians; on the other hand, it set in motion
the rapid development of informal sector activities.
Unfortunately, SAPs, which were introduced as a cure to this
crisis, have not succeeded. Instead of easing the situation, they
have worsened it. Devaluation of the local currency has been
responsible for pushing up the prices of both locally produced and
imported commodities. Reduction of government expenditures
has had disastrous effects on the provision of social services and
on the availability of employment opportunities in the public
sector. Policies advocating the privatization of parastatals and
retrenchment of workers have ended up creating more jobless
people. The abolition of subsidies on agricultural inputs like
fertilizers has raised the cost of production in the agricultural
sector, which has, in turn, increased the prices of agricultural
products and, in particular, the prices of foodstuffs in urban areas.
Although the government has been increasing the minimum
wage since 1980 (from Tsh. 600 in 1981 to Tsh. 17 000 in 1995 to
Tshs. 30 000 in 1996), this increase has never matched the rapidly
rising cost of living. The price of almost every item has been
shooting up rapidly during the period of SAPs, at a time when the
increase in wages has been very insignificant. The net result of the
stagnation of real wages and of galloping inflation for the majority
of wage earners is that they have suffered a great erosion in their
purchasing power during the last few years. At the same time,
people are supposed to pay fees for their medical and health care
services, as well as for the education of their children — services
which used to be provided freely by the state.
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The question, now, is how has this situation affected the life
conditions of the majority of people? Interviews with middle and
upper income earners in Dar es Salaam city produced a variety of
responses, such as the following:
Life is unbearable. The actual amount of money I spend for my
family per month is almost three times as much as my
monthly salary. I am forced to do a lot of things, legal and
illegal, in order to supplement my income (a comment from
one University administrator).
In the seventies, when I began working at the University as an
Assistant Lecturer, I never thought that there would come a
time when I could be a University Professor and a farmer at
the same time. My monthly salary during those days was not
more than Tshs. 1 200. Today, my monthly take home is more
than Tshs. 120 000, but even though, without keeping cows
and rearing chickens, things would not have worked easily (a
comment from a University Professor).
Most Professors do not teach anymore. They are busy doing
consultancy or attending conferences one after the other
because they pay more. Consultancy is now a full-time
responsibility and teaching is considered as part time to most
of them. The lecturers from the Faculty of Law spent more
time in courts in town than in classes. That is also their
survival strategy (a comment from one University student).
In the seventies, offices were for official business only. Today,
these are places used for petty trading like food, selling
clothing like kanga or vitenge (women’s type of clothing).
Office managers have difficulties of abolishing this behaviour
because the government keeps on advising people to supplement their incomes via small income generating projects (a
comment from an Office Supervisor from one Parastatal
Company).
These anecdotes confirm that things are now very difficult,
even for the so-called middle income earners. The cost for other
utilities has also gone up. A random sample, done at the
University of Dar es Salaam, of twenty houses with three
bedrooms each, inhabited by approximately six members and
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containing an electric cooker, indicated that the monthly electricity bill ranged between Tsh. 13 000 and Tsh. 16 000. Already,
this is almost a third of the salary of an Associate Professor at the
University of Dar es Salaam. It is thus evident that there is a wide
gap between the official incomes which people receive and the
total costs of their basic needs. How, then, is this gap bridged?
How do people survive?
In my previous study of urbanization and urban poverty in
Tanzania (conducted in 1987-88), 280 respondents, living in Dar es
Salaam, were asked to indicate their sources of extra income.
Eighty-seven percent cited the importance of informal sector
activities — such as petty trading, hawking, and street vendoring;
eighty-five percent carried out urban farming; seventeen percent
practised poultry keeping; and ten percent dairy farming (Lugalla
1995, 124). This study was general and did not distinguish the
sources of extra incomes among social classes. In the 1995 study,
however, I looked at the sources of extra income by social classes.
I repeated the same question regarding sources of extra income to
two hundred respondents in Dar es Salaam. One hundred respondents were minimum wage earners, while the remaining one
hundred belonged to middle and upper income social groups.
The findings revealed the following trends. First, both classes
were now using the informal sector in order to supplement their
official incomes. Second, the class position of individuals determines a great deal about the nature of survival strategies. Incomegenerating activities which do not require much capital or fixed
premises and which are easy to handle seem to be the domain of
the low income earners. These include petty trading, hawking,
selling cooked meals in shanty hotels, and metal works (garages).
Urban farming, dairy cattle, poultry keeping, grocery kiosks in
wooden or metal containers, and women’s hairdressing saloons
seem to be the domain of middle and upper income classes.
What is interesting is that while, on the one hand, low income
people do not participate in activities of the higher income
classes, on the other hand, relatively better off individuals are
increasingly joining in activities which were traditionally the
domain of the desperate urban poor. Although these findings
assist in understanding how people survive and how the nature of
informal sector activities and their operation have changed, they
nevertheless do not reveal much about the nature of social rela-
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tions in the informal sector. The fact that these activities are now
part of the urban economy and are becoming increasingly dominant means that it is important to know who benefits and who
suffers from these relations or what these changes mean to the
majority poor.
In order to examine the nature of social relations in the
informal sector, I asked the informal sector participants belonging
to middle and upper income classes to explain how they participated in the informal sector activities, keeping in mind the fact
that most of them were employees in the formal sector. Seventytwo percent stated that they hired other people and paid them a
monthly wage. Nineteen percent hired people, used family labour,
and also participated physically in informal sector activities after
office hours. Nine percent indicated that they were being assisted
by relatives (family labour). Those who hired people indicated
paying a monthly wage of between Tsh. 6 000 and 8 000. Four
respondents paid their labourers between Tsh. 10 000 and 12 000,
and only two paid the minimum wage (Tsh. 17 000). Those who
kept dairy cattle indicated they employ youths (boys) aged from
the ages of eighteen to twenty-four, whose responsibility was
cutting grass and milking the cows. None of them paid these boys
a monthly wage exceeding Tsh. 6 000.
Then, I randomly surveyed two hundred informal sector
enterprises in order to examine issues related to the ownership,
class, and social status of informal sector participants who worked
physically on the premises. The general age of participants seems
to range from twenty to forty-five, a fact which shows that youths
and younger adults tend to dominate in the informal sector. While
the owners of eighty-eight out of two hundred enterprises (fortyfour percent) themselves work at the enterprise, seventy-eight
enterprises (thirty-nine percent) were owned by middle and upper
income people who worked in the formal sector. Thirty-four
enterprises are owned by business people (entrepreneurs) who also
own business enterprises elsewhere.
What does one learn from these findings? While employees
from the formal sector are using their informal sector for survival
purposes, lack of government regulation, which means that the
possibility of both evading tax and breaking labour laws is high,
attracts some capitalists. These people are increasingly investing
in this sector, not for survival purposes but more for accumulation
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of profits and capital. The informal sector operators who own the
enterprise and work physically on the enterprise’s premises
feature most in marginal, unattractive, low-profit making activities like manual sand and stone quarrying, cutting and selling
grass along highways, small scale repairing services like car
mechanics, household selling stalls, and the selling of cooked
foods in shanty hotels (“Magenge”). These activities are increasingly becoming the domain of the very desperate urban poor. The
returns they get from these activities barely suffice beyond subsistence. Income generating activities which have good returns but
require also a reasonable amount of financial investment such as
wood and metal works, tailoring, grocery kiosks, women hair
saloons, construction industry materials like cement, informal
bottled beer pubs, and restaurants are nowadays increasingly
being operated by people who can afford the initial investment
costs.
In order to understand more about the nature of social relations in the informal sector, I also examined the levels of participation by both the gender and social position of participants. Of
the 535 people engaged in these enterprises, 360 (67.3 percent)
were males and 175 (32.7 percent) were females. Men featured
most in wood and metal works, auto-mechanics, brick-making,
tailoring, wood carving, grilled meat stalls, tire repair, leather
works, and dairy cattle grass cutting. Women, in most cases,
participate in hairdressing salons, stone and sand quarrying,
cooked foods, and in the entertainment industry.
Of the 215 enterprise owners, 164 (76.3 percent) were males
and 51 (23.7 percent) were females. The fact that the 200 enterprises engaged 535 people indicates clearly the potential of this
sector to absorb the surplus urban labour force. However, if one
looks at the status of people in the informal sector, a different
picture emerges as far as processes of marginalization are
concerned. The findings show that a total of 434 out of 535
persons (81.1 percent) operated in the informal sector not as
owners of the enterprises, but as labourers. Of these, 288 (66.4
percent) were males and 146 (33.6 percent) were females.

The Nature of the Informal Sector
SAPs have not meant the same thing to everyone in Tanzania. As
demonstrated elsewhere (Lugalla 1997, 61-81), SAPs have created
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wealthy individuals and have increased imported luxurious
consumer items; availability of foreign exchange is no longer a
problem; and luxurious buildings are mushrooming simultaneously with squatter, slum settlements. All of these are not
isolated processes but are instead just two sides of the same coin.
Statistics from the Planning Commission of Tanzania reveal that
SAPs have increased the rate of economic growth in Tanzania to a
four percentage rate since 1986. Clearly, there is also concrete
evidence that SAPs have improved the quality of informal sector
services and production. What do SAPs mean to the daily life of
the Tanzanian majority, and how has this situation affected the
informal sector? Who has suffered most and how?
Economic hardships resulting from the crisis and economic
reform policies have forced a majority of people to use the
informal sector as a survival strategy. With the rapid development
of the informal sector both quantitatively and qualitatively, the
informal sector of the 1970s has changed both in form and
content, particularly in terms of informal sector activities, the
nature of participants, the social relationships, the forms of
ownership, and the types of activities done and services provided.
The size of an enterprise is commonly measured in terms of
the number of workers engaged or capital invested in the business.
Anyone who has lived in Dar es Salaam during the past ten years
has probably observed the growing number of informal sector
activities which have flooded the central business district of the
city and the sidewalks of highways and streets. Urban streets are
now flooded with hawkers (“The Machingas”), grocery kiosks
selling everything, informal pubs, and fast food restaurants. Areas
which were originally restricted zones for any type of business are
now flourishing with different types of retail trade. A 1991
national study indicated that some 950 103 people were operating
in the urban informal sector. In the early 1960s and 1970s, the
informal sector consisted primarily of locally produced materials
and not imported manufactured goods. Today, the “machinga”
hawkers sell everything from clothing, tool kits, spare parts, electronic equipment, television antennae, car fittings, recorded
music video cassettes, cameras, mattresses, household equipment, mosquito nets, bags, suitcases, and cosmetics. The list is
endless. Petroleum products such as industrial and motor vehicle
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oils, grease and other lubricants, and sometimes fuels like
paraffin, diesel, and petrol — which never featured in informal
sector operations in the 1970s — are today found in every corner
of the city.

Nature of Social Relations, Forms of Ownership,
Participation, and Problems Encountered
Studies of the informal sector in Tanzania and elsewhere still
view the informal sector activities as the domain of the urban
poor and the people who participate in this sector as unskilled or
having acquired these skills informally. The policy makers of
Tanzania seem to hold this perspective. My research findings,
however, indicate significant changes in the informal sector. The
post-colonial period in Tanzania has been characterized by a
variety of social processes such as free and universal primary
education and the expansion of both institutes of higher learning
and employment opportunities in the private and public sectors.
Hence, by late 1970s, Tanzania already had primary school graduates operating in this sector. People with secondary education did
not participate in this sector at that time because opportunities
for formal employment were abundant and their wages provided
for their basic needs. Today, however, many high school leavers
and university graduates work in the informal sector. Although
this has increased competition in the informal sector, it has also
led to a tremendous improvement of the quality of both services
and products in this sector.
The crisis and the SAP policies have brought a number of
changes. First, employment opportunities have become scarce
because of the reduction in government expenditure, privatization, or abolition of some of the parastatal companies.
Retrenchment policies have created more jobless people than they
have economic growth. Second, the cost of living has gone up
tremendously amidst stagnant wages. All these processes have
generated more poverty than wealth for the majority of
Tanzanians. Tanzanians can now be divided into the “new poor”
and the “chronic poor.” The former are those people who were
relatively better off before the economic crisis and the SAPs,
either as low, middle, or upper income earners, but who, as a
result of economic crisis and SAPs, have now been pushed below
what economists would label as the “poverty line.” The latter are
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those who were already poor (below poverty line) even before the
crisis and SAPs came, but who have not been spared by the crisis
and SAPs. Their situation has worsened rather than improved.
While the “chronic poor” are those who have been using the
informal sector as a “safety net” for many years, the “new poor”
have been forced to join the activities of the informal sector in
order to supplement their official incomes.
The findings from my study reveal that even the so called
wealthy individuals, (“entrepreneurs”) are increasingly invading
this sector, not in order to survive or supplement their incomes,
but in order to enhance their processes of capital accumulation.
This qualitative change has had disastrous effects on the informal
sector. There is now stiff competition between the “entrepreneurs,” the “new poor,” and the “chronic poor.” Most of the
“entrepreneurs” and the “new poor” have formal education and
formally acquired skills. Most of the “new poor” who have joined
the informal sector are permanent employees in the formal sector
with permanent jobs, stable incomes, social security, and security
of tenure. To them, survival during the era of SAPs is not a matter
of life or death. The fact that some of them work in the public
sector and some in the formal private sector means that most of
them have connections and contacts. The relationship between
these two social classes and the “chronic poor” is not harmonious, but contradictory and exploitative. The informal sector is
now an arena of competition, exploitation, and struggle between
the desperate “chronic poor” and the others.
The findings from this study demonstrate that the relatively
better off participants are winning. In a virtual “zero sum game,”
the “chronic poor,” who desperately need the informal sector in
order to survive, are increasingly being relegated to the position of
labourers rather than owners. The wages they get as labourers are
below the required minimum wage. Further, when it comes to
getting credit or loans from banks or other sources in order to
develop small scale enterprises, it is the “entrepreneurs” and the
“new poor” who stand a better chance because of the following
reasons: they are well informed and more likely to be aware of the
existence of such credits; they know the formalities involved in
applying for a loan; they know how to prepare project proposals;
they have permanent jobs, which means they can guarantee the
banks that they are capable of repaying the loan and this makes
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them credit-worthy; they are capable of paying the down
payments; they have management skills and are bound to be more
economically successful than the “chronic poor,” whose projects
survive by sheer luck. Reliable information from some banks
show that it is people with these qualities who have been benefitting from special credit schemes aimed at promoting the informal
sector. One of the informants had the following remarks about
such schemes:
Hiyo mikopo ni maneno tu! Nilijaribu mara moja
nikashindwa. Waliniambia kuwa nitayarishe vizuri maada
ya mradi wangu ili nifikiriwe. Mimi sijui maana yake. Lakini
nimeona akina mama wenzangu, wake wa wakubwa, wana
kazi zao nzuri, wana mgari ya binafsi na ya kazini pia ambao
wamepata hiyo mikopo. Wengine zaidi ya mara moja. Hebu
angalia ile Pajero ST iliyosimama pale. Imejaza mifuko ya
chakula cha kuku na majani ya ng’ombe. Hao ndio
wanaopewa mikopo. Siyo sisi “Walala-Hoi.”
These credit schemes are mere words. I tried once but failed.
They told me to prepare a project proposal. I did not know
what they meant. However, I have seen my fellow women,
wives of people with power, they have good jobs, have access
to both private and officially owned cars who have been
granted such loans. Some of them more than once. Look at
that government owned Pajero car standing there. It is fully
packed with bags of chicken feed and green grass for cows.
These are people who get loans, not we, the poor (my translation).
One of the major changes in the informal sector is the rapid
increase of women participants in general, and, in particular, in
the kind of activities which used to be predominantly operated by
men. Earlier studies show that women participated mainly in
household and domestic related activities like selling cooked food
and working in the entertainment industry. The findings indicate,
however, that presently, men are increasingly working as bar or
restaurant attendants, occupations which used to be predominantly female. The dire need to survive, which seems to be a
process of almost hunting and gathering whatever is available, has
led to gender blindness as far as survival strategies are concerned.
Women are now increasingly participating in petty
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commodity production in order to supplement household
incomes. But their traditional role in the domestic sphere of life as
producers and reproducers has not changed significantly, which
means that their burden is increasing with deleterious effects on
their social status and health.
The policies of liberalization, which go hand in hand with the
winds of Westernization or modernization, have also brought in
Western styles of beautification. Western hair styles which
involve straightening hair with heat or cold creams are now very
popular with women. The result has been a rapid proliferation of
women’s hairdressing saloons and mini shops selling the kinds of
cosmetics which go along with this. Since these are expensive
lifestyles and one needs sophisticated connections in order to get
perfumes, creams, and curling equipment, most of which are
imported, those who participate in this business are either middle
or upper class women, and they also provide services to the same.
Thus, survival strategies are not neutral of class relations and the
winds of modernization and other processes which are polarizing
classes are now redesigning the nature of the informal sector.
What are the implications of these processes?
Reading through this description of informal sector activities
and their mode of operation, one might think that there are more
advantages than problems. In reality, however, there are risks and
constant harassment from the government precisely because,
according to the law, most of these activities are considered
illegal. Following established procedures means that one has to
apply for a license, which calls for fixed premises and the payment
of a tax, in addition to complex and expensive red-tape. Moreover,
there are also disadvantages of operating a business outside the
country’s legal framework. One has to operate the business under
the psychological pressure of uncertainty. Many hawkers, street
vendors, and other informal sector operators have to walk with
some money in their pockets ready to bribe the authorities in
order to encourage them to look the other way. The money paid
as bribe buys them nothing beyond the freedom to try to earn a
living (Rossett 1987, 4).
In addition, the government has enacted several laws which
coerce the unemployed in urban areas. For example, in 1983, the
government enacted a Penal Code amendment which banned
from cities “idle and disorderly persons” involved in so-called
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“unproductive” activities. A year later, it passed the Human
Deployment Act, requiring all Tanzanians to be registered and
provided with labour identification cards. Those who could not
meet these requirements (including the self-employed) were to be
settled in the countryside. Various studies show that most of the
people who operated in the informal sector were lumped into this
“idle and disorderly category” and treated as “loiterers” (Tripp
1990; Lugalla 1990, 1995). In fact, President Nyerere, while
emphasizing this policy directive, said that, “if we don’t disturb
loiterers, they will disturb us.” The so-called loiterers were
compared with economic saboteurs and racketeers “whom the
nation has declared war on” (Daily News 26 September 1983: 1;
Tripp 1990, 57).
Since then, the coercive instruments of the state have used
these laws to harass informal sector operators. Evidence from this
study reveals that it is always the desperate poor who have
become victims of police harassment. For example, after waiting
a long time to round up all the street vendors and hawkers popularly known as “machingas” in the famous “Congo Street” in the
Kariakoo area of Dar es Salaam, the City Council implemented its
decision in early August 1993 by ordering the Field Force Unit of
the police to round up all the vendors and hawkers (Lugalla 1997,
78). The “Human Resources Deployment (Nguvu Kazi) Act,”
which became effective in 1983, is always used by the state to
achieve these ends. Despite these pressures, the informal sector
has kept on growing, and there is a clear indication that the coercive measures adopted by the state against the informal sector are
simply solving the symptoms rather than the essential problems
of relations.

The Future of the Informal Sector
The findings of this study confirm that the informal sector
possesses the potential to continue contributing to the development of the economy and to skills training in particular. It is
evident that the sector will also continue to be a source of employment opportunities for the majority of the urban poor, as well as
a strategy for survival and capital accumulation for some social
groups. Consequently, any policy aimed at developing the
informal sector must seriously consider the following issues.
First, it must examine the social processes of change within the
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informal sector in order to identify the key participants. It must
also know which participants use the informal sector for survival
purposes, which ones use it to supplement their incomes, and
which use it to accumulate more profits and capital. Second, and,
in fact, related to the first, it is important to know which participants need to be assisted and how. The objectives of policy formulation must therefore be guided by a specific direction. The
important guiding question should be: Should policy promote the
informal sector so that it contributes to economic growth? Or
should policy promote this sector so that it generates economic
growth and contributes to alleviating poverty and social and
economic inequalities? How should Tanzania and other countries
in sub-Saharan Africa proceed?
Article 5 of the Preamble of the 1988 Khartoum Declaration,
“Towards a human focused approach to socio-economic recovery
and development in Africa,” states:
Since the human being is the center of all development, the
human condition is the only final measure of development.
Improving that condition is essential for the poor and vulnerable human beings who comprise the majority of our peoples
in Africa. Africa’s men and women are the main factors and
the ends for whom and by whom any programme and implementation of development must be justified.
Similarly, the 1995 World Social Summit which took place in
Copenhagen emphasized three main themes on which any development strategy for Africa has to focus. These themes are: alleviation of poverty, elimination of unemployment, and enhancement
of social integration. Policies aimed at promoting the informal
sector must also pay direct attention to these three themes. The
Khartoum Declaration, as well as the three themes of development suggests that, “development,” above all, is about people.
Development programmes must therefore be human oriented and
must strive to improve the conditions of life for the majority of
the population. Hence, policies intending to promote the informal
sector must aim at improving the social and economic conditions
of life for the majority of people. Is this happening in Tanzania and
other countries of sub-Saharan Africa? Evidence from Tanzania
indicates that it is far from accommodating the spirit of the
Khartoum Declaration in its development plans. It is doubtful
whether the three themes of development identified during the
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Copenhagen summit are now integrated in Tanzanian politics.
In attempts to promote the informal sector, it is evident that
development plans of Tanzania continue to believe that this
sector is occupied by the urban poor — the unskilled who lack
formal training — and thus relies on locally available resources
and raw materials, family labour, and easy entry. These plans do
not therefore acknowledge the changing nature of the informal
sector. It is doubtful whether policy formulators understand the
qualitative changes which are taking place there. Lack of this kind
of analysis has led to a situation where informal sector policy
programs have ended up hurting would be beneficiaries. Existing
informal sector policies in Tanzania do not spell out which activities will be supported and how. Identifying such activities is
important because the informal sector is very broad in terms of its
activities and very mixed in terms of its participants.
At present, the informal sector can be divided into two main
groups. First are the so called “Modern Activities” (modern or
traditional only in terms of how and where they operate) like
motor vehicle repair, hair dressing salons, carpentry, metal works
workshops, and others. These activities take place in specific fixed
premises. Most of them are now owned and controlled by people
working in the formal sector who have formally acquired education and skills. Second are the “Traditional Activities” like
hawking, petty trading, the selling of cooked food in streets, and
others. Such activities do not have fixed premises, are highly
mobile, and, in most cases, are operated by the very poor.
Historical evidence, as well as the results from this study, indicates that all policies which claim to promote informal sector
activities tend to focus on the “modern activities,” and not on the
“traditional ones.”
It is these activities which benefit from established credit
schemes. For example, SIDO has existed since 1973. Credit
schemes have been operating for the last few years. But evidence
from studies, including this one, reveals that those who benefit
are not always the desperate poor. It is also important to acknowledge that informal sector operators know how to organize their
business. They have informal associations or cooperatives which
assist them in organizing their activities. Some operators have
informal credit schemes which work very well. Social networks
based on ethnicity also need to be explored in order to understand
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how they operate in the informal sector. The “Upato” system
among women, which involves the lending of money to the
members of the group on a rotational basis, is a case in point. It
seems that, rather than thinking that informal sector operators are
ignorant and disorganized and that, therefore, the government can
superimpose institutions on them, it is better to learn from the
initiatives of informal operators themselves and then proceed in
creating policies which are a product of these initiatives. Such
policies are bound to easily accepted and sustainable, and they
may bring positive fruits.
As O.J. Fapohunda (1990) has noted that for Zambia, in an
attempt to promote the informal sector, the government must
also distinguish at least three roles on the basis of which the
informal sector can be developed. First, a static role exists in
which informal sector activities fill up vacant economic spaces in
the economy, thereby increasing the efficiency of formal sector
activities through backward, forward, and lateral linkages and also
thereby satisfying hitherto unsatisfied consumer and producer
needs. The growth of such activities is essentially determined by,
and derived from, the structure and performance of the formal
sector. Second, an evolutionary and dynamic role exists in which
some informal sector activities autonomously expand on the basis
of efficiency, economies of scale, and diversification, thereby
transforming themselves into formal sector activities. Since this
second role might ruin the weak informal sector activities, the
government must make sure that it protects and assists those
activities which accommodate the most needy, but least assisted,
persons. Hence, the third role of the informal sector should be
seen not only from an economic point of view, but also in terms
of alleviating poverty of the majority of the population and eliminating social economic relations of exploitation and inequality.
The government must ensure that the majority of the poor have
access to loans and other forms of credit schemes.
The informal sector activities which fulfill the static role are
those characterized by petty trading, hawking, and street vending.
The activities associated with the second role are those enterprises that increase the value-added products. These include
small-scale farming, manufacturing, and processing. Experience
from other countries demonstrates that many governments find it
difficult to design policies to promote the static role and, there-
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fore, fail to implement the third role. Governments feel that the
enterprises which fulfill the second role deserve promotion.
Tanzania holds this belief too.

Conclusion
The optimistic view held by most development planners that the
growth of the informal sector is an open-ended process with wide
chances for everyone to participate and succeed must now be
doubted. The situation in Tanzania suggests more pessimism than
optimism about the development trend and change in the
informal sector during the era of social economic crisis and SAPs.
The road to expansion varies; it is both arduous and cumbersome.
While to some it is open and very easy, to others it is blocked and
very restrictive as a result of exploitation and marginalization.
The economic crisis and the accompanying SAPs contribute a
great deal to enhancing these processes by reducing the number of
state employees and drastically undermining their real incomes
through inflation. As H. Bernstein has argued, “in the discourse of
neo-liberalism, this was a brutal but necessary adjustment” (1992,
77).
The development of the informal sector is not just an
outcome of pressures and constraints, but is, above all, an issue of
class, shaped by the relations of social economic inequality which
are dominant in Tanzania. The dangers of marginalization and
exploitation in the informal sector are real, but their conditions
and magnitude vary from one type of activity to the other. In this
case, generalizations are difficult. Therefore, the government
needs to carry out in-depth studies in order to design policies
which are specific. The fact that the informal sector is fragmented, diversified, and mixed in terms of activities, participants,
and modes of operation confirms that it is, indeed, difficult to
adopt a blanket policy to promote the informal sector.
In developing policies to promote the informal sector, it is
important to distinguish between macrolevel and microlevel
actions. While the former are the responsibility of the state or
central government, the latter can be carried out more effectively
by the informal sector operators themselves by means of their
associations and any other forms of organizations. The local
governments can also play a vital role at this level. In order to
understand what can be done at the microlevel, it is essential to
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differentiate between “survival” and “growth.” The informal
sector acts as a survival sector for a majority of the poor people
and will continue to play a role irrespective of positive or negative
intervention from policy makers. What is at issue here is how to
stimulate growth within the informal sector without superimposing conditions which might end up formalizing these informal
survival processes.
It is also important to emphasize that promoting the urban
informal sector is just a short-term solution to the problems of
urban unemployment and urban poverty. A long-term solution
requires addressing the process of rural-urban migration. It is rural
poverty which is pushing a lot of people to the urban areas. As the
Director General of UNICEF has observed, “it is widely known
that the poor have usually gained least in good times and suffered
most in bad times” (Bernstein 1992, 77). Overall, social economic
development policies which focus on improving rural and urban
life conditions (balanced development) might lead to a lasting
solution. This should be in the minds of development planners in
Tanzania; otherwise, they risk putting the cart before the horse.

Notes
1

This statement was made by the Secretary of State for colonies and
quoted by the Governor of Tanganyika in 1935.
2 Fapohunda (1990) has noted a similar trend in Zambia.
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